Rent Seeking, Tax Policy, and Economic Growth by Polterovich, Victor
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Rent Seeking, Tax Policy, and Economic
Growth
Victor Polterovich
New Economic School
2001
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20058/
MPRA Paper No. 20058, posted 18. January 2010 10:43 UTC
Victor Polterovich
RENT SEEKING, TAX POLICY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Working paper #2001/025.
Prepared for the VIII CONFERENCE “TRANSFORMING GOVERNMENT IN
ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION”, November 2-4, 2000. The research was fulfilled
within the NES Research Program and sponsored by Ford Foundation.
МОСКВА
2001
Polterovich V.M. Rent seeking, tax policy, and economic growth./ Working
paper#2001/025.- Moscow, New Economic School, 2001.- 43 p.(Engl.)
It is suggested a Romer-Barro - type model of endogenous economic growth where
producers contest for distribution of a fixed share of the government’s tax  revenue. The
proportional contest mechanism is assumed. We studied conditions under which consumers
gain or lose due to existence of the rent seeking (RS) opportunities. It is found that RS always
decreases rate of growth but nevertheless may raise consumer’s overall utility. RS is
advantageous if tax rate is too high or rate of production return is too low. The area of
parameters, where RS has positive effect, is larger for more impatient consumers.
We study also a static RS production model with heterogeneous producers and show
that excessive tax burden creates incentives for RS (which is interpreted as corruption). It is
argued that the producers’ support  of corruption-free regimes depends on the marginal cost
elasticity of the production technologies and may be reached due to technical progress.
The results demonstrate that the connection, observed in a number of empirical
papers, between economic development and RS may be two - way since it may be caused by
factors that influence both RS and economic growth.
Полтерович В.М. Присвоение ренты, налоговая политика и экономический
рост./ Препринт # 2001/025 - М.: Российская экономическая школа, 2001 г.- 43 с.(Англ.)
Предложена модификация модели эндогенного экономического роста  Ромера –
Барро, в которой фирмы состязаются за перераспределение фиксированной доли
налогового дохода правительства. Предполагается пропорциональный состязательный
механизм. Изучаются условия, при которых подобная деятельность по присвоению
ренты (ПР) приводит к выигрышу или проигрышу потребителей.
Анализ показывает, что возможность ПР в производстве уменьшает темп роста
экономики, но, тем не менее, может увеличить интегральную полезность потребителей.
ПР приводит к выгоде потребителя, если налоговые ставки слишком высоки, или если
технологическая продуктивность чересчур низка. Область параметров, в которой
эффект ПР положителен, шире для более нетерпеливых потребителей.
В работе изучается также статическая модель производства с разнородными
производителями и бюрократом, распределяющим  субсидии за взятки. И в этом случае
избыточная налоговая нагрузка стимулирует присвоение ренты. Поддержка
производителями безкоррупционного режима зависит также от технического прогресса,
определяющего характеристики производственных функций.
Полученные результаты показывают, что связь между экономическим
развитием и ПР, установленная в ряде эмпирических работ, может быть двусторонней ,
так как она определяется факторами, которые влияют одновременно и на присвоение
ренты, и на  экономический рост.
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3PART I. Rent seeking in a model of exogenous economic growth
I.I. Introduction
Wide-spread expectations prevailed at the beginning of the transition
processes in Russia and other East European countries that market institutions
would arise spontaneously just after elimination of the centralized control. These
expectations were not realized. It is clear now that spontaneous forces push the
economic systems towards a different direction: government power is substituted
at least partially by mafia control and corruption and rent seeking hampers the
creation of western type market relations  ( Alexeev, Gaddy, Leitzel (1995 ),
Leitzel (1996), Levin, Satarov (1997)). The new situation is somewhat similar to a
“bad” equilibrium, when agents do not want any changes or do not able to enforce
them.
A number of papers addressed this issue. Most of the authors analyze the
costs of  rent seeking (RS) activity and stress that higher governance quality and
stronger law enforcement are needed to diminish the costs (Shleifer and Vishny
(1993), Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993),  Bicchieri and  Rovelli (1995), Bac
(1996), Gelb, Hillman, and Urspring
( 1996 )) . The theoretical conclusion, that economic growth is dependent on
institutional quality, is supported by empirical researches (McCallum, Blais
(1987), Shleifer (1997), Olson Jr., Sarna and Swamy (2000), Popov (2000)). A
comprehensive survey of the results is given in Aron (2000).
There are also some recent evidences that economic performance influences
institutional quality ( Heybey and Murrell (1999), Chong and Calderon (2000),
4Paldam (2000))1.  The quality is measured by indices that reflect corruption level,
property right enforcement, rule of law, but do not contain information about the
government skill to choose macroeconomic policy. However some researchers
underline that imperfect economic policy creates a base for RS and corruption. In
fact a few  papers  examine this issue on a theoretical level .  Ericson developed a
general equilibrium model with bribes and demonstrated that the bribe equilibrium
could be a Pareto improvement if price distortions prevailed in an economy
(Ericson (1983)). In Loayza (1996), it is shown that distorted tax policy may give
incentives for tax evasion.
Another important result was got by Polischuk and Savvateev  (1997)  (see
also Savvateev (1997)). They have shown that “social stability” of  a  RS regime
depends on the elasticity of marginal cost function.
An economy can get out of a rent seeking regime only if a significant part of
population recognizes that RS is harmful. Therefore it is very important to know
the conditions under which RS is or is not advantageous. This is the main issue of
my article. I do not assume that government is perfect. Its non-optimal tax policy
and presence of externalities creates possibilities for RS to be advantageous. But
every rent seeker has also production opportunities. Therefore the gain from RS
depends also on technological efficiency and, in a dynamic framework, on the rate
of consumers’ time preferences.
I use two models to study connections between tax policy, technological
efficiency, and consumers’ preferences from one side and social stability of RS
                                                          
1 Paldam has found that the corruption scale depends negatively on rate of growth and GDP per
capita if one consider these indicators separately. However, the dependence  is robust with respect
to GDP in multiple regression whereas the coefficient to growth even changes sign. In the
framework of our model, this may be partially explained by the presence of common productivity
factor which influence both rate of growth and GDP per capita (see below).
.
5regimes, from the other one. In both models RS is associated with reallocation of
the state revenue, the case which is particularly important for transition economies.
The benchmark of the first model is the exogenous growth theory developed by
Romer (1986) and Barro (1990) (see also Barro and Sala- I- Martin (1992)). I build
a proportional content mechanism in a Barro model of economic growth.
This RS scheme is traditional for RS considerations (see Lu (1994),
Polischuk and Savvateev (1997)). Endogenous growth models were used in Loayza
(1996) to study the shadow economy and in Mohtadi and Roe (1998) where
lobbing was considered. The last paper is closer to my approach but it uses quite
different contest mechanism and does not admit distorted government policy.
The second model, that I use, is static. It gives possibilities to investigate RS
activities of heterogeneous producers and to exogenize  the proportion of the state
revenue assigned to RS.
The first model is considered in the next two sections of the Part I. Part II is
devoted to the second model. Each Part has its own numeration of the sections,
statements and formulas.
I.2. A growth model with RS
It is considered a Romer-Barro - type model (Romer (1986), Barro (1990),
Barro-Sala-i Martin (1992)) of exogenous economic growth where a representative
consumer maximizes overall utility function
max ∫∞
0
u(c)e−ρ t dt   with respect to c(t), a(t)                    (1)
subject to the budget constraint
c + da/dt = ra + y ,                                           (2)
6antd to the No-Ponzi-Game condition
a(t)exp(- ∫t
0
r(ξ)dξ) → 0  if t → ∞,                         (2a)
where c is consumption, ρ > 0 is the constant rate of time preference, a is the
quantity of real assets (a(0) is given), r is the real rate of return, and  y is  the
maximal production profit. The consumer chooses c and a taking r and y as given
quantity. For simplicity and following a tradition, we take labor force as a constant,
and assume that the instantaneous utility function is given by
u( c ) = c1−θ/(1- θ),
where θ is a positive constant, θ ≠ 1.
A representative producer distributes rented capital, K, between production
and rent seeking (RS) opportunities to find maximal value y of his/her profit
function
y = max K, s [(1 - σ)F( K-s, g) + ps – rK] .                          (3)
Here F(k,g) = A k1−αgα is a Cobb – Douglas production function that depends on
production capital k = K – s, and on the quantity of public services, g. The
constants A, α are positive, α < 1.  Government uses a fixed tax rate, σ, to collect
tax revenue that is supposed to be a source of public services g.   However, a fixed
share, γ, of the revenue collected, turns out to be a subject of the RS activity.
Producers choose the quantity s  of capital to seek for direct subsidies ps, where p
is defined by the proportional contest mechanism. If si is RS capital of the producer
i then she/he gets
si γσ ΣjF( kj,g) /Σsj ,
7so that p =  γσ ΣjF( kj,g) /Σsj . The number of producers is supposed to be fixed and
all of them are similar. Therefore they make the same decisions in an equilibrium, s
= si, k = ki.
   Thus the equilibrium conditions are as follows:
a = K = k + s,                                               (4)
g = ( 1 - γ)σ F( k,g),                                       (5)
ps  = γσ F( k,g).                                              (6)
The model ignores depreciation of capital. This seems to be a usual simplification.
However, in our case it includes an implicit assumption that depreciation rates are
equal for productive and RS capitals. The RS capital is spent to build lobbing
organizations and long-run connections, to pay salaries and bribes. Probably, this
kind of capital depreciates faster than productive capital. The difference in
depreciation rates may be taken into account in our model but calculation would be
more complicated in this case.
I.3. Comparative statics
In this section we study under which conditions consumers gain or lose due
to RS activities of producers and how variations of the parameters influence the
role of RS.
In view of (3), equations (2) and (4) entail the following balance equation
c = (1 - σ)F( k,g) + ps – dk/dt – ds/dt.                           (7)
The first order optimality conditions for the problems (3) and (1),(2)
involve:
p = r = (1 −σ) Fk ,                                         (8)
θλ = (1 − σ)Fk − ρ =  r − ρ,                                  (9)
8where subscript denotes a partial derivative with respect to a corresponding
parameter, k,  and  λ is a consumption growth rate.
Using (6), (5), (8), it is simple to check that the following equality is valid
for the Cobb-Duglas function F
s/k = γσ  /(1- α)(1- σ).                                   (10)
Taking into account (7), (6), (10) and the equality
(1- σ)F(k, g) = rk/(1 - α)
one has
c/k = r/(1-α) − λ − (λ − r) s/k .                            (11)
Similar to the benchmark Romer – Barro case, our model has no transitional
dynamics. The economy develops with a constant growth rate λ (see Appendix 1).
This is a consequence of the facts that the equilibrium quantity, g, of the public
good and the total equilibrium quantity, F(k,g), of the good produced are linear
functions of capital k (see (5)),
   g = [A (1 - γ)σ]1/(1 - α) k,                                           (12)
  F(k,g(t)) = A[A (1 - γ)σ]α/(1 - α) k .                                   (13)
In view of (8) and (12) the rate of return, r, is constant on the equilibrium
trajectories,
   r =  (1−σ)(1 − α) A[A (1 - γ)σ]α/(1 - α) .                                (14)
One gets a straightforward conclusion from (9) and (14) that RS hampers
economic growth.
Proposition 1. Growth rate, λ, is a decreasing function of the scale, γ,  of the
RS activity.
However, this does not mean that consumers lose from RS since their overall
utility depends not only on λ, but also on initial consumption c0. RS is a way to get
9back a part of the tax revenue extracted by the government. One can expect that if
the tax burden is too excessive RS may be advantageous.
Let c = c0eλ t . Below we investigate how the maximal value, Φ, of the utility
function (1) depends on γ.                
One has from (9)
Φ = c01−θ / (1−θ) q,                                          (15) 
where q = r− λ. The integral exists iff q > 0 which  equivalent to the relation2
r (1 −θ) <  ρ.                                            (16)
In view of (14 ) we get:
rγ  =  −α  r /(1-α)(1 - γ).
Besides, θq = ρ - (1 - θ)r.
Therefore                         θqγ = - (1 - θ)rγ = (1 - θ) αr/(1-α)(1 - γ).
It follows from (9) that θλγ = rγ . Therefore λγ = - rγ /(1−θ).
Let k0 = 1. Using (11) and formulas above, it is simple to check that
c0 = q(s0 +1/(1- α)) +λα/(1−α),
c0γ = qγ[s0 + 1/(1 - α) - α/(1 - α)(1 - θ)] + qσ/(1 - α)(1 - σ),
where s0 is defined by (10 ) for k = 1 .
Since q > 0 and (1-θ)−1qγ > 0, the sign of the derivative Φγ coincides with the
sign of the following function
Γ = [(1-θ)c0γ/qγ - c0/q](1 - α)(1- σ) /θ.
After substitution c0γ , qγ , c0 , and q, and after some  manipulations, we get
Γ = -1 + σ(1−γ) − α(1− σ)/θ ω +ωσ/(1 - α)(1 -γ)/α,               (17)
where 
ω = (ρ/r +θ - 1)/θ,                                               (18)
                                                          
2 This requirement follows also from the No-Ponzi-Game condition (2a).
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and r is defined by (14) (see Proposition A2 in Appendix 2).
Obviously, ω >0 since, by assumption, q > 0.
Our model and the function Γ depend on six parameters γ, σ, A, ρ, α, and θ.
For different sets of parameters, the RS activity may influence positively or
negatively on the wealth of population. It is natural and convenient to understand
advantageousness and harmfulness of RS in a local sense in accordance to the
following definition.
Definition 1.We say that RS is (locally) harmful at x =(γ, σ, A, ρ, α, θ)  if
Φγ < 0, and RS is (locally) advantageous at x if Φγ > 0. 
One can expect that population would oppose RS if it were harmful and
support RS if it were advantageous.  If RS is advantageous at x where γ = 0 then
consumers prefer to have a non-zero RS scale.
Definition 2. A variation of a parameter is RS- promoting (RS- opposing) if
it may transform an RS-harmful state into advantageous one (an RS- promoting
state into RS-harmful one), but not vise versa.
It was mentioned above that the function Γ( x ) has the same sign as Φγ.
Using formula (17), (18), and (14), one can check that Γ(x) grows to infinity if
σ approaches 1; Γ(x) decreases with respect to A and increases with respect to ρ.
Therefore Propositions 2 and 3 are valid3.
Proposition 2.  For every set of parameters (γ, A, ρ, α, θ) one can find
σ∗  such that RS is advantageous at all x = (γ, σ, A, ρ, α, θ), σ > σ∗. 
Thus consumers are not interested in decreasing of the RS scale if the tax
rate is too high.
                                                          
3 Propositions 2-5 are proved in Appendix 2.
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Proposition 3. An increase of the time preference rate ρ and a decrease of
the productivity constant A are RS- promoting. Moreover, let x0 = (γ0, A0, ρ0, σ0,
θ0) be fixed, and x’(A) = (γ0, A, ρ0, σ0, θ0) and  x’’ (ρ) = (γ0, A0, ρ, σ0, θ0). Then
there exist A*, ρ* such that RS is advantageous at x’(A) if A>A*, and RS is harmful
if A < A*; RS is advantageous at x’’ (ρ) if ρ < ρ*, and RS is harmful if ρ > ρ*.
The following two propositions can be proved by straightforward
calculations if one takes into account that the inequalities λ > 0 and ω < 1 are
equivalent.
Proposition 4. RS is harmful at every state x such that λ > 0 and
σ < σ∗ = (αθ + α2 ) / (θ + α2 ).
Note that the last inequality is definitely valid if the tax rate σ is not
succeeded its optimal value α since α < σ∗. 4
Proposition 5. RS is advantageous at every state x such that γ = 0,  λ < 0,
and σ > σ∗ .
The rate of growth λ is higher if A is larger or ρ is lower. The same mistakes
in the tax policy may give rise to RS in one country and do not have this
consequence in another one if consumers of the first country are more impatient
and its technology is less productive.
Let us assume now that the scale of RS activity γ is endogenous and is
changing in accordance to the following differential equation
                           dγ/dt = f(Φγ),                                                (19)
where f is an increasing function, f(0) = 0. This relation entails that γ increases if
RS is locally advantageous and decreases if RS is locally harmful. In our model,
                                                          
4 One can check that α is the optimal tax rate in the corresponding welfare optimization problem
(Barro,1990).
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the root of RS advantage is excessive tax burden and, as a result, inefficiency of
the government services.
As  a function of γ, the maximal present value, Φ, of the utility function (1)
may have several extrema.  An important case is shown on Fig.1.  Five parameters
α, ρ, θ, σ, A are fixed (α = 0.6, ρ = 0.3, θ = 0.94, σ = 0.8, A = 2.15), and γ is
changing from zero to 0.95. We do not consider γ = 1 since our formulas lose their
sense. (If γ = 1 then there is no growth).  If γ is small then RS is advantageous. One
may expect that the scale of RS activity, γ, will increase and will stabilize on the
level where Φ reaches its maximum (γ ≅ 0.15). Assume, however, that the scale of
RS activity increases due to some causes and became larger than interior minimum
(about 0.7 on  Fig.1).
Fig.1
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Fig.2
Now RS turns out to be locally advantageous again, and the intrinsic forces have to
shift γ to an arbitrary small neighborhood of its maximum value 1. This means that
a smaller proportion of the tax collected is used as a source of public service.
Therefore investment into production turns out to be inefficient, and the agents
should prefer to intensify RS activity, i.e. to increase γ. The more intensive is RS,
the less efficient is production, and the stronger incentives exist to intensify RS.
This kind of positive feedback is a standard cause of so-called institutional traps
(Polterovich, 1999).
Strengthening control and punishments for deviating behavior and
development of mechanisms of competition are standard measures usually
suggested to exit from institutional traps. However, some other possibilities are
much less understood on the theoretical level. An institutional trap can disappear
14
due to technology improvements or decrease of the time preference rate.  Fig. 2
and Fig.3 demonstrate these possibilities. The curve of Fig.2 corresponds to the
same parameters as Fig.1 for exception of productivity coefficient A, which is
larger for Fig.2. The increase of productivity changes drastically the shape of the
curve. The interior minimum disappears, and the RS advantageous interval shrinks
up to small neighborhood of the point γ =1.  A similar transformation takes place if
the rate of time preference, ρ, decreases, as it is shown on Fig.3.
The propositions above lead to a hypothesis that negative correlation
between RS and growth, observed in a number of empirical papers, is not
necessarily a result of negative influence of the RS activity on the economic
development. It may be, at least partially, caused by factors that influence both RS
and the economic growth.
Fig. 3
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Appendix 1.
Proposition A1. Equilibrium functions c(t), k(t), s(t) are exponential with
equal exponents.
Proof. Euler’s equation for the problem for the problem (1), (2), (2a) is as
follows (-u″( c ) / u′ (c ) )  (dc/dt) = r – ρ .
Since -u″( c ) / u′ (c )  = θ / c , one has the relation (9)
θλ = r - ρ.
The equilibrium real rate of return r is constant (see (14)), hence the
equilibrium consumption growth rate λ is constant as well.
The equality (10) follows from the equilibrium condition (16) and the first
order optimality condition (8). This equation entails that s/a is a constant on the
equilibrium trajectories. Then y/a is also a constant in view of (3), (13), and (8).
Denote  µ = r + y/a. Now the equation (2) can be rewritten as follows
da/dt - µa = - c0  e tλ .
Its general solution is  as  follows : a = H e tµ  + Q e tλ .
Since µ > r, the No – Ponzi – Game condition (2a) can be valid only if      H = 0, λ
< r. Thus Q = a0 , and a(t) = a0 e tλ  . In view of (10) indicators s and k have the
same constant rate of grows λ. The Proposition A1 is proved.
16
Appendix 2
Proposition A2.  The expression Γ, which is is given by the formula (17),
has the same sign as Φγ .
Let c = c0 e tλ  , λ = const. Then the overall utility function
Φ = (1 - θ) 1− ∫ ∞
0
c0 θ−1 exp[λ(1 - θ)-ρ]tdt = (1 - θ) 1− c0 θ−1 1/[ρ - λ(1 - θ)],                 (A1)
where ρ > λ(1 - θ). In view of (9),
q = r - λ = ρ - λ(1 - θ),                                      (A2)
therefore
 (1 - θ)Φ = c0 θ−1  /q.                                             (A3)
Differentiating (A3) and (A2) with respect to γ, one has
q 2 ( 1- θ)Φγ  = c0γ( 1- θ) c0 θ−1  q - c0 θ−1  /qγ,                      (A4)
qγ = - λ γ( 1- θ).                                                (A5)
Formula (11) and (A2) entail
c0 = q(s0  + 1/(1 - α)) + λα/(1 - α).                          (A6)
Therefore
 c0γ  = qγ(s0  + 1/(1 - α)) + q s0γ +  λγ α/(1 - α).             (A7)
In view of (10) s0  = γσ/(1- α)(1 - σ); s0γ  = σ/(1- α)(1 - σ).
Therefore and due to (A6), (A7), and (A5) one has
(1- α)(1 - σ)c0 = q(γσ + 1 - σ) +  λα(1 - σ),               (A8)
(1- α)(1 - σ)c0γ = qγ(γσ + 1 - σ) + qσ -  αqγ(1 - σ)/(1 - θ).          (A9)
Let us denote
θΓ = q(1 - θ)(1 - α)(1 - σ) c0 θ−1 Φγ/qγ.                   (A10)
Then, multiplying (A4) by c0 θ−1  (1 - α)(1 - σ)/qq γ θ one gets
17
  θΓ = (1 - θ)(1 - α)(1 - σ) c0γ/qγ - (1- α)(1 - σ)c0/q.       (A11)
Let us substitute (A8) and (A9) into (A11).
θΓ = (1 - θ)[γσ + 1 - σ] + (1 - θ)σ q/q γ - α(1 - σ) –
[γσ + (1 - σ)] – α(1 - σ)λ/q.                                  (A12)
Note that
                         q = r - λ = [ρ - (1 - θ)r]/θ;                                  (A13)
                            q γ = - (1 - θ)rγ /θ;                                         (A14)
                        rγ = - αr / (1 - α)(1 - γ)                                     (A15)
 in view of (14). Therefore
q/q γ = [ρ - (1 - θ)r](1 - α)(1 - γ) / (1 - θ)αr;
λ / q = (r - ρ) / [ρ - ((1 - θ)r].
Denote ω = (ρ/r – 1 + θ)/θ .  Obviously, ω > 0. Then
                 q/q γ  =  θω (1 - α)(1 - γ) /α(1 -  θ);                        (A16)
                          λ / q = (1 - ρ / r) / θω.                                   (A17)
Now, we have from (A12), (A16), (A17)
θΓ = -θ[1 – (1 - γ)σ] + θσ(1 - α)(1 - γ)ω/α - α(1 -σ) – α(1 -σ)(1- ρ/r)/θω.
Since ρ/r – 1 = ωθ - θ, we have the following relation
           Γ = -1 + (1 - γ)σ + σ(1 - α)(1 - γ)ω/α - α(1 -σ)/θω,           (A18)
which coincides with (17).
It follows from (A14) and (A15) that qγ /(1 - θ) = - rγ θ > 0. Therefore
Proposition A2 is a consequence of the equality (A10).
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3.
The function Γ(γ, σ, α, θ, ω), defined by (17), is increasing with respect to
σ, θ, and ω and decreasing with respect to γ and α. The function
18
ω(ρ, θ, r(σ, γ, α, A)) = ω(θ, σ, ρ,γ, α, A),
 defined by (18), increasing with respect to ρ, and decreasing with respect to γ and
A. Therefore Γ(x) decreases with respect to A and increases with respect to ρ. This
proves the first statement of Proposition 3.
Evidently, r(σ = 1) = 0, ω(σ =1) = ∞, and Γ( σ = 1) = ∞. This entails Proposition 2.
To prove the second statement of Proposition 3, let γ0, A0, ρ0, σ0, α0, θ0 be
fixed. Then  Γ is an increasing function of ω, and Γ(0) < 0, Γ(∞) > 0. Therefore
there exists ω* such that Γ(ω*) = 0. The function ω(A, ρ), defined by (18), is
increasing with respect to ρ and decreasing with respect to A. It maps each of the
intervals of feasible values of A and ρ into (0,∞). Therefore one can find A* and ρ*
such that  ω(A*, ρ0) = ω*,  ω(A0, ρ*) = ω*. Proposition 3 is proved.
Proof of Propositions 4 and 5.
Let  α and θ be fixed, and V(σ) = -1 + σ - α(1 - σ)/θ + σ(1 - α)/α.
The inequality λ = r - ρ > 0 is equivalent to the inequality
ω = (ρ/r + θ - 1) /θ < 1.
If ω < 1 then
Γ < -1 + σ(1 - γ) - α(1 - σ)/θ + σ(1 - α)(1 - γ)/α < V(σ).
If λ < 0  then ω > 1, and, under γ =0, we have:  Γ> V(σ). The function V(σ) is
increasing with respect to σ and has  σ* = (αθ + α 2 )/(θ +α 2 ) as its zero. Therefore
both Propositions 4 and 5 are valid.
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PART II. Corruption and the tax policy5
II.1. Preliminary remarks
In the model studied above we assumed that producers are homogenous, the
production functions have very simple and special form, and the proportion of
government revenue assigned for RS does not depend on rent seekers’ efforts. In
the second part of the paper we consider a static production model where, however,
all these restrictions are removed.
Below an equilibrium model is developed where corruption behavior is
described in revealed form and the technology  of counter- productive reallocation
is derived from behavioral assumptions. The model includes an arbitrary number of
producers and a representative bureaucrat- bribe-taker.   Production  functions
depend on two inputs that are  a homogeneous resource (money)  and  a public
good. The bureaucrat collects a part of GDP as  tax payments and has to transform
it into the public good. But he/ she prefers to receive bribes giving some part of the
government revenue as subsidies to producers. The bribe-taker  decisions are
generated by maximization of  a goal  function that brings into confrontation
money utility and disutility of  punishment.  The corruption equilibrium is
compared with an optimal corruption-free regime.  I demonstrate that non-optimal
tax policy can result in support of a corruption regime by some or even by all
producers. It is proved that if  the tax rate is not bigger than optimal one and
marginal cost elasticity  of production functions is not bigger than 16  then the
corruption regime is Pareto inferior independently on the scale of corruption  and
                                                          
5  A version of this Part circulated as a manuscript from 1998, and some results were described in
Polterovich (1998).
6 This condition was received by Polishchuk and Savvateev (1997) for a model with
homogeneous producers  and  without taxes and public goods.
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initial resource allocation. More general sufficient condition connects the tax rate
level and the law enforcement degree. I  argue as well that  the marginal cost
elasticity condition can be  supported by fast technical progress.
In the next section I describe the model and prove that  the corruption
equilibrium resource allocation is a solution of  an optimal programming problem.
Existence and uniqueness results follows from this observation. I consider also a
variant of the model that admits reallocation of  initial  resources between
producers (Section 3). Section 4 contains the main theorem and discussion of the
conditions that guarantee  social stability of the corruption-free regime
independently on the punishment level for corruption. The proof  is based on a
consideration of  a “limit case”  when  the model is reduced to Polishchuk and
Savvateev (1997) construction but with different production functions for different
agents.   Their main results is generalized in Section 5. Section 6 contains the proof
of the main theorem and some comparative statics exercises. Section 7 concludes.
II. 2. Corruption  equilibrium
        I consider a set of producers indexed by i each of them has initial amount of
money Mi . Prices of the production input and outputs are supposed to be fixed
and do not figure in the model. The production  i is described by a production
function Fi (mi, g) that depends on the amount mi of money invested and the
quantity g of a public good which is free of charge. A representative bureaucrat
collects taxes by tax rate σ and has to transform the collected money  into public
good. But he/she prefers to allocate a part of this money as direct subsidies to
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producers for bribes7. The bribe system is supposed to work as a competitive
market so that a bribe price q of the ruble of subsidies is set up to equilibrate the
supply and demand for subsidies. Every producer allocates his/her money between
production and bribes  solving the following maximization problem:
max  (1-σ)Fi (mi, g) + zi     w. r. to (mi , zi )          (2.1)
               qzi + mi = Mi                                          (2.2)
                               mi ≥ 0  ,       zi ≥ 0                                  (2.3)
where zi is the subsidy received.
The bureaucrat compares his/her utility of money mb  received as bribes and
the disutility  from possible punishment,  that depends on the proportion  γ of the
total government income Z. The amount γZ is  assigned to subsidies to producers
and the rest for public service.  The proportion γ is chosen   as a  solution of the
following problem8:
                max  U(mb , γ)                                     (2.4)
where
                      mb = qγZ ,  0 ≤  γ ≤  1.                         (2.5)
Definition 1. A set of numbers (mi , zi ,  i∈ I , γ, g, Z, q ) is said to be a corruption
equilibrium if  (mi , zi) is a solution of  (2.1)-(2.3), γ is a solution of  (2.4)-(2.5) ,
and the following equalities hold
Z = σΣFi(mi, g)                                        (2.6)
                                                          
7 This is a very stylized description. Usually total subsidy level  and  distribution of subsidies are
results of interactions among many bureaucrats and lobbing groups.
8 Two simplest  form of the utility function are u (mb) - π(γ) or u (mb) / π(γ) where u is utility of
money and π  is a penalty function. Our assumption that  disutility of punishment depends not on
absolute value of bribes but on  the relative scale of  bribe activity seems to be reasonable though
it needs to be tested.
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                           Σ zi = γZ                                                (2.7)
               g = (1- γ)Z .                                             (2.8)
In the sequel,  the set of producers is supposed either to be finite or to be
equal to a segment.  In the later  case, the  symbol Σ  will denote integration over
the segment.
Let us study the model. Below we use the following assumptions.
A1. The Fi  are increasing for mi > 0, g > 0 and smooth;  Fi(0,0)=0; they are
strictly concave with respect to mi; their partial derivatives F′i1(0, g)=∞ under g >0.
A2.  U is defined for all mb  ≥ 0  and  γ ∈ [ 0,1) ,  smooth,  strictly concave,
its partial derivatives satisfy the conditions U1′ >0, U2′ <0, U1′(0 , γ) = ∞.
           A2a.  U2′(mb , γ) / U1′(mb , γ) → - ∞ as γ → 1.
           A2b. U1′(mb , γ)  decreases as γ grows.
The  condition A2a means that the disutility of punishment  increases much
faster than utility of  money, when the bureaucrat devoted almost all money at
his/her disposal to the corruption activity. In accordance to A2b a stronger
punishment diminishes  marginal utility of money.
From (2.2) and (2.7) the equilibrium price is as follows,
                                      q^  = (M - m^ ) / γ^ Z^                                 (2.9)
where the hat  “^”  symbol denotes equilibrium values of the parameters,
M = ΣM i  ,  m^  = Σm^i .
Relations (2.2), (2.5) and (2.7) yield
           m^b = M - m^ ,                                        (2.10)
and (2.4), (2.5) implies by A2a
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         U1′(m^b , γ^) m^b + U2′(m^b , γ^)γ^  = 0.                          (2.11)
A2 implies that the left hand side decreases as a function of γ , and there exists a
function Γ defined on (0, ∞) such that
                       γ^ = Γ(m^b), 0 < Γ(m^b) <1.                               (2.12)   
Solving (2.2) with respect to zi  and using  (2.6), (2.9), (2.10), (2.12) we get the
following equivalent form of  the problem (2.1) - (2.3) at equilibrium
max Fi(mi, g^) + Λ(µ^ (.), g^)(Mi - mi)                           (2.13)
0 ≤  mi  ≤  Mi.                                          (2.14)
where µ^(.) is the vector whose components are m^i (a function of i) and
Λ(µ(.), g) = σΣ Fi(mi , g) Γ(M - m) /(M - m)(1 - σ) .               (2.15)
The first order condition for (2.13), (2.14) is written as
F′i1(m^i, g^) ≥ Λ(µ^(.), g^)                                         (2.16)
where (2.16) is satisfied as soon as ( as an equality) if m^i < Mi.
( F′i1 represents the derivative of  the function Fi with respect to first argument).
Let us introduce a function
M-m
B(m) = ∫ 1 ( Γ(x)/ x)dx
and consider the following problem :
max (1 - σ) ln ΣFi(mi, g^)  + σ B( m), w. r. to (mi )               (2.17)
                                               m = Σ mi                                                                      (2.18)
                                     0 ≤ mi ≤  Mi ,  i∈ I .                                     (2.19)
Proposition 1. The function B is concave.
Proof. We need to prove that the function ψ(x) = Γ(x)/ x is decreasing. From (2.11)
we have for x = m^b > 0, γ^ = Γ(m^b)
U1′(x , xψ( x)) + U2′(x, xψ(x))ψ(x) = 0.
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This can be considered as  an identity which defines ψ. Differentiation
entails the following equality
U11′ +U12′ (ψ +xψ′) +  U2′ψ′ + U21′ψ + U22′ (ψ +xψ′) ψ  = 0.
All  second derivatives are negative, by concavity and by A2b. Since
U2′ <0 one has to conclude that ψ′ <0. Hence B is concave.
  The following statement substantially simplifies the exploration of our
equilibrium model .
Theorem 1 (Equivalence Theorem). If A1, A2 are valid then an array
(m^ i , z^ i ,  i∈ I , γ^, g^ , Z^ , q ^)  is an equilibrium if and only if
(m^ i ,   i∈ I )  is a solution of  (2.17)- (2.19) and the following equality holds
g^ =(1- Γ(M - m^)) σ ΣFi(m^i, g^) .                                       (2.20)
We omit the proof for it follows straightforwardly from a comparison of the
first order optimality conditions for the optimization problem and the equilibrium
conditions including (2.20).
Note that an equilibrium value g^  is a parameter of the maximized function
(2.17). A remarkable  case arises, if the following  assumption is valid,
A3. Fi(mi , g) = fi(mi ) ϕ(g).
Instead of ϕ(g) one can take αi ϕ(g) and then redefine fi. Assumption A3, means
that the elasticities of the production functions with respect to public good are
equal and independent of money expenditures.
The  following statement is a straightforward consequence of  both A3 and
the Equivalence Theorem.
Theorem 2.  If  A1- A3 hold, then an equilibrium allocation
(m^ i ,   i∈ I ) is a solution of the problem
max (1 - σ) ln Σfi(mi)  + σB( m)                                            (2.21)
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under the constraints (2.18), (2.19). Moreover if ϕ(g) is strictly concave then the
corruption equilibrium is unique.
The last statement of Theorem 2 follows from equation (2.20) by
monotonicity of the function g / ϕ(g).
Theorem 2 shows that the equilibrium money distribution can be found
independently on the public good. After that all other equilibrium parameters can
be calculated straightforwardly9.
Existence of a corruption equilibrium is also a consequence of  Equivalence
Theorem.
Theorem 3.   Assume A1, A2 hold, Fi(m, g) /g → 0 as g→ ∞, and
Fi(m, g) /g → ∞ as g→ 0 for every m >0 and i. Then there exists a corruption
equilibrium.
Proof. Let S(g^) =(Si(g^)) be the  solution of  the problem (2.17)-(2.19)
Denote G (g^) = g^ - (1- Γ(M - Σ Si(g^)))σ ΣFi( Si(g^), g^).
Evidently G(g^)>0 if  g^ is large enough, and G(g^) <0 if  g^ is small. By Theorem
1,  the proof is complete.
II.3. Corruption equilibrium with markets
In this Section we introduce both credit and borrowing into the corruption
system. The agent problem (2.1)-(2.3) has to be modified accordingly to  account
for this new possibility.
max  (1-σ)Fi (mi, g) + zi +phi     w. r. to (mi , zi , hi),          (3.1)
                                                          
9 Theorem 1 stays valid if  strict concavity in A1 is substituted for concavity. In this case
equilibrium money distributions form a convex set.
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               qzi + mi + hi = Mi ,                                         (3.2)
                mi ≥ 0  ,    zi ≥ 0                                            (3.3)
where h i  is  credit (or borrowing quantity if h i is negative),  p-1 is interest rate. To
define the concept of equilibrium one has to add Σhi = 0 to the equilibrium
conditions (2.6)-(2.8).
The maximized function (3.1) is equal to (1-σ)Fi (mi, g) + (Mi - mi)/q + (p-
1/q)hi . At equilibrium p = 1/q, and the agent problem is reduced to (2.13) but
(2.14) does not constrain the choice.  Therefore the statement of Equivalence
Theorem holds for corruption equilibrium with markets (CEM) if  one eliminates
the inequalities (2.19).
Suppose A1-A3 obtain. First order conditions for (3.1)-(3.3) at equilibrium
as well as for (2.20), (2.18) have the form of equalities (compare (2.16))
f′i(m∼i) = λ(µ∼(.))                                         (3.4)
where µ∼ (.) = (m∼i , i∈ I) is CEM- allocation  and
λ(µ(.)) = σΣfi( mi )ΓΓ(M - m) /(M - m)(1 - s).                            (3.5)
CEM- money allocations (m∼i , i∈ I) have a remarkable property. Define the
feasible  initial endowments (Mi , i∈ I)   such that ΣMi = M, and consider  the total
corruption equilibrium (CE) aggregate output YF = ΣFi(m^i, g^)  and the aggregate
CE bribe spending H = M -Σ m^i  as functions of initial  endowments.
Proposition 2. Assume A1-A3 obtain and assume j is strictly concave, then
the quantity g^  of public good, the value Σfi(m^i), and CE output YF= ΣFi(m^i, g^)
reach their maxima and CE bribe spending H = M- Σm^i reaches its minimum when
Mi ≥ m∼i , i∈ I. In this case, CE allocations coincides with CEM allocations.
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Proof. If  some  F.O.C. are satisfied as strict inequalities, then initial
endowments can be redistributed such that Σfi(m^i) increases and H decreases. In
the new  CE  allocation, g^ is larger by both  (2.20) and strict concavity of j.
Therefore YF is also larger. Hence if YF  reaches its maximum, then all F.O.C. are
satisfied  at equality, and CE allocation coincides with CEM allocation.
Proposition 3.  Assume A1-A3 obtain and assume j be strictly concave, then
every producer prefers a CEM to a  corruption equilibrium with the same inital
endowments Mi , i.e.
Fi(m∼i, g∼) + Λ(µ∼ (.), g∼)(Mi - m∼i) ≥ Fi(m^i, g^) + Λ(µ^ (.), g^)(Mi - m^i)             (3.6)
for all i (see (2.13), (2.15)).
To prove the proposition, let us consider (2.15) and let us write (3.6) in an
equivalent form
(fi(m∼i) +λ(µ∼ (.))(Mi - m∼i))ϕ (g∼) ≥  ( fi(m^i) + λ(m^ (.))(Mi - m^i))ϕ(g^ )           (3.7)
where  λ is defined by (3.5).  A3 and Proposition 2 imply that ϕ(g∼) ≥ϕ(g^ ) and
that λ∼ =λ(m∼ (.)) ≥ λ^ =λ(m^ (.)). The inequality (3.6) is valid since
fi(m∼i) +λ∼ (Mi - m∼i) ≥  fi(m^i) + λ∼ (Mi - m^i) ≥  fi(m^i) + λ^ (Mi - m^i).
The main goal of this paper is to analyze determinants of corruption in
framework of the model described. First of all we define corruption-free
equilibrium and  ask if it is Pareto-superior to corruption regimes.
II. 4. Corruption- free equilibrium: the problem of social stability
Let us define a concept of equilibrium without corruption but with markets
or corruption- free equilibrium (CFE). If corruption is suppressed and credit
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market exists then the producer problem   is transformed into the following model
(compare (3.1)-(3.3))
 max  (1-σ)Fi (mi, g)  +p(Mi -mi)    w. R. To mi ,                  (4.1)
where the price p of credit  is chosen in order the solutions m*i of the problem,
(4.1 ) be balanced: Σm*i = M , and g* = σΣFi (m*i, g*).
If A3  is fulfilled,  then the CFE allocation is the solution of the following
problem,
                            max  Σ (mi),  Σ mi = M .
To be short we will say sometimes that  a producer  “ votes against corruption” if
the CFE-value of her/his   welfare function is not inferior to the CEM-value,
respectively that  she/he “supports corruption” in the opposite case.
Our purpose is to describe the conditions under which a corruption -free
regime is Pareto- superior to  a corruption equilibria.  In this case the CFE can be
considered  socially stable. If this condition prevails then  there is a hope that  a
corrupted economy might transform into a corruption-free one.
Let us consider cost function c(y) which is the inverse of the production
function y = f(m). Denote by ei the elasticity of the marginal cost function
corresponding to fi . One can check that
ei = ci″yi/ci′ = - f i’’fi /(fi ’)2.
In what follows, we asume that
                                      ϕ = gα,  α > 0.                                                    (4.2)
The following theorem is the main result of the Part 2.
Theorem 4. Assume A1-A3 be valid, elasticities ei of marginal cost
functions ei  ≤ 1,  and
           σ ≤ K(γ, α) = [1 - (1 - γ)α/(1−α) ] / [1 - (1 - γ)1/(1−α) ]                           (4.3)
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where γ is a CEM value of the bribe proportion. Then all agents prefer the CFE to
the CEM and hence, to the corruption equilibrium with the same initial amounts of
money Mi.
We prove this statement in Section 6 after considering of a special “limit
case”. The function K(γ,α) increases with respect to γ and reaches its infimum α at
γ = 0. Thus criterion (4.3) can be broken even under maximal punishment, if
                                                 σ > α.
However one should note  that the Government problem can be formulated
as the maximization of the following social welfare function
               (1 - σ)Σfi(mi) ϕ(σΣfi(mi)g) = (1 - σ)σα/(1+α) (Σfi(mi)) (2−α)/(1+α)
under Σmi = M with respect to mi and σ.  The problem is separated into two
distinct problems: a) maximization of the output Σfi(mi) and  b) maximization of
the function (1 - σ)σα/(1+α) with respect to σ. The solution of the latter is equal to σ
= α. Therefore Theorem 4 entails the following  important statement.
Theorem 5. Let A1-A3 and  (4.2) be valid, ei  ≤ 1, and tax rate σ is not
larger than its optimal value σ = α. Then the condition (4.3) holds, and all agents
vote against corruption.
Thus under assumption ei ≤ 1 the agent may support corruption only if the
tax rate is above its optimal level i.e. if the state pretends to be more influential
than it is entailed by existing technology of public service production . In the last
case moderate corruption (not very large γ ) can be  preferable for some or even for
all producers. To understand the situation let us take a close to zero. Then increase
of public service g above 1 gives a small production effect, so that tax extraction
turns out to be a loss for the economy. Therefore the producers prefer to get back a
part of the lost money through corruption. Only if the corruption is large enough to
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fulfill (4.3) then its negative effect outweighs and the producers vote against
corruption.
The following example illuminates the situation.
Example 1: initial allocation is optimal, ei ≤ 1 but all producers gain from
corruption since (4.3) is not fulfilled.
Let production function be equal for two producers: fi(m) = m1/2 , i = 1,2. It
means ei = 1. We put γ = σ = 1/2; M = 32, Mi = mi* = 16. For the CF equilibrium
we have
WiCF = (1 - σ)(g*)α[f(mi*) + λ*(Mi - mi*)] = 2(g*)α
and g* = σ2 (m*)1/2(g*)α so that g*α = (4)α/(1-α).
Obviously mi = m, i = 1,2 for the CEM equilibrium. Hence
λ = (σYγ)/H(1 - σ) = m1/2/(M - 2m) = fi′(m) = 1/2m1/2,
therefore m = M/4 = 8, and WiCEM = (1 - σ)gα [m1/2 + λ(Mi - m)] = (3√2/2)gα,
where g = (1 - γ) σ 2 gαm1/2 = gα √2  so that gα = (√2)α/(1-α). If α is small enough
then
(g*)α ≅  gα  ≅  1, and  WiCF ≅  2 < WiCEM  ≅  3√2/2.
One can note that ei = 1 in this example which is clearly not crucial.
Condition (4.3) holds also if the tax rate is larger than its optimal level, but
corruption level is large enough so that the corruption activity turns out to be
inferior.
There is a common belief that law enforcement  is needed to enhance
efficiency and  to diminish transaction costs. Example 1 and Theorem 4 show that
it is not always true (if one says just about a production criterion and  does not take
into account a moral damage from corruption.)
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One can show that the marginal cost elasticity (MCE) condition of Theorem
4 is also substantial (see  Savvateev (1997) , Polishchuk and Savvateev (1997) and
Example 2 of the next section). If MCE condition is not fulfilled then strong law
enforcement can be necessary to avoid corruption.
The MCE condition needs to be discussed in greater details. First of all, note
that the “corruption technology “ is linear in our model : the allocation of subsidies
among producers is proportional to the amount of bribe money paid. The MCE  is
equal to zero if  a  production function is linear. One may assume that  a relation
between MCE’s of the production  and  corruption technologies does matter. This
observation leads to the following idea: to fight  corruption one needs not just to
increase punishment strength (decreasing g) but  to change the competitive (linear)
corruption mechanism.  We do not develop this idea here.
For positively homogeneous functions, the value of MCE depends inversely
on the degree of homogeneity and hence reflects “efficiency” under large input
values. Probably fast technical progress supports  low MCE levels.  The following
simple argument based on Arrow’s learning by doing idea explains why this could
be the case.  The MCE is equal to 1/α -1 for F(K, L) = Kα(Α L)β if labor quality A
is a constant. But the MCE decreases if, due to  technical progress, the labor
quality positively depends on capital accumulated: A = Kζ .
To prove Theorem 4, we consider first the following “limit case”, which has
an interest of its own.
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II. 5. A “limit case”: no law enforcement, no public service
Let us consider the case of no law enforcement and no public service: γ = 1,
α = 0. Then the producer i utility function Vi (σ) has the following CEM value
(see (3.1),(3.2), (2.9), (2.6))
Vi (σ)  = (1 - σ)fi(mi) + σr(Mi - mi),                                          (5.1)
where r = 1/q~,
σr =  σY/H = (1 - σ)fi′(mi),                                                (5.2)
Y = Σfi(mi),  H = M - Σmi ,                                                 (5.3)
and  mi ,   i ∈ I , are CEM-values.
In our original notation mi.= mi~ .  We omit the symbol ~  to simplify
notation. In the “limit case”  punishment for corruption is not effective at all and
tax collection is distributed totally through bribes. The model considered in
Polishchuk and Savvateev (1997) can be interpreted as this “limit case” under
additional assumption that all agents have identical production functions.
Let us prove the statement of Theorem 4 for this case10. Let (mi*, p* ) be CF-
equilibrium . Note that if σ → 0 then mi → mi* due to Equivalence Theorem. In
view of (5.2)  σr → fi′(mi*) = λ*. Therefore
Vi* = fi(mi*) + λ* (Mi - mi*) = limσ→0Vi(σ).
                                                          
10The left hand side of (4.3) is indefinite under γ=1, α=0.  The considerations below will show
that  it has to be taken as 1 for this case. (One can imagine that 1-γ approaches zero much faster
than α, for example γ = 1 - exp(- 1/α2)).
33
To prove Theorem 4 we calculate Viσ′ = dVi/dσ. It turns out that the
derivative Viσ′ is negative if ei ≤ 1 for all   i. Therefore Vi reaches its maximum at σ
= 0, that proves the statement.11
In fact we will be able to get a little bit stronger result: it is enough that ei ≤
1/(1-σ) for Viσ′ to be negative. Under this condition a small decrease of the
appropriated proportion σ is  Pareto-improving.
Let Q = σr . Rather straightforward calculations entails successively the
following formulas12
r/(1 - σ) + σr′σ = (1 - σ)fi″(mi)miσ′ ;                                         (5.4)
rσ′ = r Σmiσ′ / H(1 - σ);                                                            (5.5)
rσ′ = r2 η / (1 - σ)[(1 - σ)2H - σrη],                                          (5.6)
where   η = Σ1/fi″(mi);                                                             (5.7)
Qσ′ = r + σrσ′ = [(1-σ)Y + Σ(fi′)2/fi″] / [(1-σ)H - Σfi′ / fi″].         (5.8)
Formulas (5.4) − (5.8) are valid independently on conditions concerning elasticity
of marginal costs ei.
If  ei = - fi″ f / (fi′)2  ≤  1/(1-σ)  we have Σ(f i′)2/fi″ = - Σfi/ei ≤ -(1-σ)Y,
 therefore Qσ′ ≤ 0.
Using (5.2) one has
Viσ′ = -fi(mi) + Qσ′(Mi - mi).                                           (5.9)
If   Mi - mi  ≥ 0 then Viσ′ < 0 , and the statement is proved.
                                                          
11There is a way to prove the statement through simpler calculations. But our method permits us
to make other useful conclusions.
12One can get  (5.4) and (5.5)  making use from (5.2) after differentiation of  identities
 σr = (1 - σ)fi′(mi)  (see (5.2)) and ln r  = lnY- ln H with respect to σ. The equality (5.6) follows
from (5.4) and (5.5).  Equality (5.8) can be received  if one substitutes  (5.6) in the identity Qσ′ = r
+ σrσ′ and uses (5.2) again.
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The case Mi - mi < 0 does not require the condition ei ≤ 1/(1-σ). We have
Qσ′ = (σr)′ = ((1 - σ)fi′(mi) )′= -fi′ + (1 - σ)f″mσ′ ≥ -fi′ ,               (5.10)
since
                            mσ′ < 0                                                        (5.11)
in view of (5.4) - (5.7).13 Therefore  Qσ′(Mi - mi) ≤ - fi′(Mi - mi)
if Mi - mi < 0. Let us use (5.9) and concavity of the production function f.
We have
Viσ′ ≤ - fi(mi) - fi′(mi)(Mi - mi) ≤ -fi(Mi) < 0.                          (5.12)
It completes the proof of Theorem 4 for the limit case.
Now it is simple to check that the following statements are valid.
Proposition 4. Let γ = Γ(mb) ≡ 1 and σ = σ0 is fixed. If a producer purchases
additional amount of money mi at a CEM equilibrium to use it in production (i.e.
Mi - mi  ≤  0) then her/his welfare function increases as σ diminishes from σ0 up to
zero. The producer votes  against corruption.
The Proposition 4 follows from (5.1) and (5.11).
Proposition 5. Let γ = Γ(mb) ≡ 1 , and ei ≤ 1/(1-σ) for all   i.  Then
producers’ welfare functions decrease in a small neighborhood  of  σ, and one can
diminish the proportion of appropriated quantity to reach a Pareto- improvement .
If, moreover, ei ≤ 1 then all producers vote against corruption.
Corruption can root in both types of distortions: wrong initial resource
allocation or wrong tax policy. Proposition 5 shows that the special conditions for
production functions can compensate both types of distortions in the “limit case”.
                                                          
13Indeed rσ′ < 0 due to (5.6),(5.7). Therefore Σmiσ′ < 0. But (5.4) entails that all miσ have the same
sign.
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The “limit case” gives a good opportunity to check the supposition that
inefficiency of the tax policy can support corruption. Let us consider the case of
optimal initial resource allocation: Mi = mi*, mi* are CFE value. The following
proposition is an evident consequence of (5.8), (5.9).
Proposition 6. If Mi = mi* and σ is small (σ ≈ 0) or large enough (σ ≈ 1)
then all producers vote against corruption.
Indeed, if σ ≈ 0 then mi ≈ Mi = mi*. Due to (5.11) mi ≤ mi* and Qσ′ is bounded from
above: Qσ′ ≤ Y/H. Therefore Viσ′ < 0 due to (5.9).
If σ ≈ 1 then mi ≈ 0, Y ≈ 0, r ≈ 0, H = M - Σmi ≈ M. Hence Qσ′ ≤  Y/H, Y/H
is a small quantity, and Vi are small for all i, Vi ≤ Vi*. This proves Proposition 6.
If all producers have the same production functions, fi(mi) = f(mi), then mi =
m, mi* = m*, r = Y/H = f(m)/(m* - m), and (5.1) entails that all producers vote
against corruption (see also Polishchuk, Savvateev (1997)). One can suppose that
the same is true for arbitrary σ. But this guess is not valid as the following example
demonstrates.
Example 2. Some agents may prefer corruption even if initial resource
allocation is optimal.
Let  fi(mi) = hi - 1/mi,  i = 1,2;  M = h1 + h2;  σ = 1/2. Then  m1* = m2* = M/2,
and
V1* = f1(m1*) = h1 – 2/M,                                            (5.13)
fi′(mi) = r, therefore mi = 1/√ r = 1, r = [h1 – 1 + h2 –1]/[M –1 –1] = 1.We have
   V1 = (1 - σ)f1(m1) + σr(m1* - m) = 3h1/4 + h2/4 –1.                    (5.14)
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If one takes h2 ≥ 4 + h1 then V1 > V1*  and the first agent prefers the
corruption regime.14
One has to take into account that the optimal tax level is equal to zero when
public service is absent. The elasticity of marginal costs is bigger than 1 in this
example. Therefore the economy is sensible to the policy mistakes. The corruption
advantage is rooted in the tax policy imperfection.
II. 6. Proof of Theorem 4 and some comparative statics
Proof . Due to Proposition 3 CEM is Pareto superior to every CE, therefore one has
to compare CFE and CEM. For notation convenience in this proof we will omit
symbol ~ in notation of CEM parameters. We will prove that
WiCF = (1 - σ) ϕ(g*)[fi(mi*) + λ*(Mi - mi* )] ≥ Wi CEM  =
                   (1 - σ) ϕ(g)[fi(mi) + λ(Mi - mi)]                       (6.1)
where
 λ* = fi′(mi*),                                                      (6.2)
 λ = fi′(mi) = (σYγ) / H(1 - σ),   H = M - Σmi ; Y = Σfi(mi),               (6.3)
and      g* = σΣfi(mi*) ϕ(g*),                                                     (6.4)
           g = σ(1 - γ)Σfi(mi) ϕ(g) .                                             (6.5)
It follows from (6.3) that
                                                          
14The functions fi do not fulfill condition fi(0) = 0 which is usually demanded. But the same
considerations are valid for the following smooth and concave functions:
fi(m) = mhi2/3 - m2hi3/27 if 0 ≤ m ≤ 3/hi, and fi(m)  = hi - 1/mi if m ≥ 3/hi .
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1 - σ = (1 - σ(1 - γ)) Y/(λH + Y).                           (6.6)
From (6.4) and (6.5) we get in view of Proposition 2
(g* / g ) ≥ 1/(1 - γ)1/(1−α).
Therefore and due to homogeneity of ϕ one has using (4.3)
η = (1 - σ) ϕ(g*) / [(1 - σ(1 - γ)) ϕ(g)]  ≥
                                   (1 - σ) / [(1 - γ)α/(1−α)(1 - σ(1 - γ))]  ≥  1.  (6.7)
Let us denote ν = σγ[1 - σ(1-γ)]-1.                                                      (6.8)
From (6.7) we have         ϕ(g*)/ϕ(g) ≥ [1 - σ(1 - γ)]/(1 - σ) = 1/(1 - ν).
Let λ be given by (6.3) and let r = Y/H.                    (6.9)
Then (1 - ν)λ = σγ(1 - ν)r/(1 - σ) = νr .                                        (6.10)
Therefore (6.1) can be written as
Vi* = fi(mi*) + λ*(Mi - mi*) ≥ Vi = (1 - ν)fi(mi) + νr(Mi - mi)             (6.11)
where νr = (1- ν)fi′(mi) = νY/H  due to (6.9), (6.10) and (6.3), and
 λ* = fi′(mi*).                                       (6.12)
The problem to prove inequality (6.11) under the condition (6.12) coincides
with  the problem considered in Section 5 if one substitutes ν for σ. The difference
is that now ν depends on mi since γ  = Γ(M - Σmi). Nevertheless an analogue of
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Proposition 5 is applicable to compare CEM and CFE- values of the welfare
functions. It entails Theorem 4.
Due to Proposition 4 we conclude that every producer  i with Mi - mi < 0
votes against corruption if (4.3) holds. Proposition 6 and (6.8) lead to the
conclusion that elasticity conditions can be avoided if the corruption level is small
and tax  rate and initial allocation are optimal.
Proposition 6’.  If  Mi = mi* , γ is small enough and σ is optimal, σ = α then
all producers prefer corruption - free equilibrium.
To study the influence of the tax rate σ let us assume that Γ(x) is an
increasing function. Since Γ(x)/x is decreasing and A3 is valid one can derive from
(2.20) that its solution mi is a decreasing function of σ. Hence γ = Γ is an
increasing function of σ. Therefore ν increases from zero to one as σ grows. Let
the conditions of Theorem 4 hold. Then the welfare functions of producers are
decreasing functions of σ due to Proposition 5.   This conclusion is not surprising
since under our assumption increasing of the tax rate entails higher proportion of
the bribes.
Let us consider the results of strengthening of the law enforcement. Let Γ1
(x) > Γ2(x) for all x. Using F.O.C. for the problem (2.20), (2.18) one can derive the
expected result for CEM equilibrium: all mi are higher for Γ2 , equilibrium value of
γ is lower, ν is lower and all producers gain under the conditions of Theorem 4. It
is clearly not necessary true if the conditions are not valid.
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II.7.  Concluding remarks
One can ask whether some countries are underdeveloped because their
government are not able to suppress RS activities, or RS activities prevail in these
countries because they are underdeveloped and use inefficient technology and
administration.  An answer is very important since it defines a rational strategy of
governance. If RS is responsible for low wealth then strengthening law
enforcement may be the main issue. But if RS is a consequence of  a wrong
macroeconomic policy and low productivity then quite different measure may be
effective to diminish the RS intensity and rise the wealth: one should improve
technologies of production and decision making. The considerations above show
that both directions of the causality are important. Therefore campaigns of fighting
RS and corruption may be counter-productive if they do not include improvements
of the macroeconomic policy. A balanced strategies are needed to enhance
attractiveness of investment into production.
The notion of corruption equilibrium was defined above for a special kind of
corruption activity connected with government spending for industrial public
service and with bribe competition for subsidies. For this setting, we  demonstrate
that support of corruption is connected not only with imperfections of initial
resource allocation, but also with non-optimal tax policies, and  that an efficient
policy itself does not guarantee social stability of  corruption-free equilibria. The
conditions were described that entail Pareto-superiority of corruption-free regimes.
These results seem to be important for the understanding of a two-side
connection between rent seeking and economic growth. On the  one hand rent
seeking  hampers economic growth. On the  other hand quantitative growth with
slow change in technologies can entail increase of  marginal cost elasticity under
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large inputs in view of exhaustion of extensive growth factors. Technical  progress
diminishes this elasticity and  creates incentives to dismantle counter-productive
regimes. It leads to a testable hypothesis that corruption and RS have to be
intensive not only in young low efficient economies, but also in old stagnating
systems.      
The comparative statics of corruption equilibria was investigated here under
very restrictive assumptions. More efforts should be done to understand the
behavior of the economic system when conditions of Theorem 4 are not fulfilled
and corruption can be supported by some producers. An important task is also the
incorporation of a more general RS mechanism, studied in Part II, in a growth
model.
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